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Introduction
 
Quarter of a century had passed since Asia attained its fame as a sizzling socioeconomic zone
 
in the global flow.Asia’s open regionalism,initiated by such inter-governmental organizations
 
as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC),drew vastly-developing countries in this region
 
closer to each other through increased trade, international communication, and population
 
movement.?This created a cultural arena in which the identities and lifestyles of people living
 
in Asia’s industrial economies are contested through marketing powers.The flow of Japanese
 
popular culture into other Asian countries,known as“J-trend (日流),”the subsequent flow of
 
Chinese popular culture or“C-trend (華流)”in various parts of East-and Southeast Asia,and
 
a more recent wave of“K-trend(韓流)”from Korea are attributes of symbolic competition by
 
which consumers can realize and celebrate the urban lifestyle of Asia’s emergent middle-class
(figure 1).?
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Studies, as well as the organizers of “Asian Cultures:Confluence and Divergence,”for offering an
 
opportunity to present this preliminary investigation on the subject of Japanese popular-cultural
 
influence abroad.Data presented here are subject to the ethical protocol of social scientific research.
Privacies and confidentialities of all institutions and individuals mentioned in this paper are protected
 
under the Privacy Protection Act.Please be sure to consult with the author for duplicating this paper,
regardless of length and form.All visual materials (figures)are subject to strict personal and institu-
tional copyrights,and should not be duplicated any further.
?APEC was founded in 1989.Its original members included Australia,Brunei,Canada,Indonesia,Japan,
Malaysia,New Zealand,Singapore,South Korea,Thailand,the Philippines,and the United States.The
 
People’s Republic of China,Hong Kong,and Taiwan joined in 1991,followed by Mexico and Papua
 
New Guinea in 1993,and Chile in 1995.“Open regionalism”was a vision put forth by former Japanese
 
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama during APEC summit meeting in 1993. Murayama, alongside
 
former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s proposition to develop “Asia-Pacific Community,”encouraged
 
regional institution building that could avert sub-regional trade wars and protectionism. See Hadi
(1995)for greater details.
?These types of Asian trends are represented by the spread of pop songs (J-pop,C-pop,and K-pop),
movies,melodramas aired on television,street fashions,and/or animations across other Asian coun-
tries.
From the vantage point of the Japanese,a nation-state that has long been demarcated by its
 
distinct national identity in Asia, accompanied by a strong sense of cultural homogeneity,
recent regional inclinations toward “cultural diversification”(文化の多様化) or “cultural
 
mitigation”(文化的緩和)challenge people to reflect upon their national status and to re-imagine
 
their collective identity in the face of speedy sociocultural liquidation.This is a new phase in
 
Japan’s modernization, or what Koichi Iwabuchi calls a strategic, historically-embedded
 
project of reorienting its national position within a familiar Asianism narrative.According to
 
Iwabuchi, Japanese interest in its cultural export is growing and this tends to be informed
 
predominantly by a historically constituted nationalistic desire for “Asia.”In this context,
Japanese popular cultural forms are designed to raise Japan’s position in Asia and to reassert
 
Japan’s cultural superiority over other Asian countries.Activated popular cultural flows are
 
inducing Japan to encounter the achievement of capitalist modernity by several neighboring
 
Asian nations―modernity that encompasses familiar but different modes of cultural produc-
tion and consumption (Iwabuchi 2002:17,18).
My attempt in the current investigation will be to build on where Iwabuchi had left off,and
 
to examine in reference to data gathered during my recent ethnographic fieldwork the percep-
tion of Japanese consumers toward the popularity of J-trend in other Asian countries.Are these
 
consumers truly recognizing the allegorical power of J-trend in Asia?Are they relying on such
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Figure 1.The cover of the February 2006 issue of Junon (special edition)as an example of C-pop
(left),and the cover of the April 2005 issue of Kanryu?Senpu?(right)as an example of K-pop.
a power in order to reassert Japan’s cultural superiority over other Asian countries?If so,in
 
what specific way(s)do they construe and configure the preeminence of J-trend back in Japan?
What is the effect of this sort of cultural contention?If not,is the perseverance of J-trend as
 
the symbol of national power an issue of importance at all for the people of Japan?
In place of Iwabuchi’s brilliant but scrapped illustration of the effort made by the setters and
 
buyers of J-trend toward emphasizing Japan’s cultural imperialism after all, I will provide
 
some alternative and critical views that Japan’s young consumers pose as the result of their
 
realization of the social meaning of J-trend in Asia. My informants consist of two-dozen
 
Japanese students from three universities in Tokyo,who all are in their early to mid 20s.These
 
informants have the experience of staying in other Asian countries for three-to four-week
 
period to learn language and culture. Their destinations include China, Indonesia, the
 
Philippines,Singapore,South Korea,Taiwan,and Thailand.
My informants became acquainted with manners in which J-trends were received in these
 
places,and they were capable of articulating somewhat intelligent discussions on the proposed
 
subject.I consider my interviews with these informants to be the constituent of one small but
 
significant portion of my ethnographic project that aims to gather great many perspectives and
 
mass-oriented narratives concerning the overseas influence of Japanese popular culture.I will
 
apply pseudonyms for all of my informants’personal names in the subsequent description.
Revisiting J-Trend in the Era of Asianism
 
On March 16,2007,a Japan-based online media source on Chinese news and entertainment
 
called Record China uploaded an article entitled“Prime Minister Abe’s statement concerning
 
comfort women influences Ziyi Zhang.”The article reported reactions of Chinese website
 
viewers who,after having seen the image of their national pop star Ziyi Zhang (章子怡)in a semi
-nude posture on a large billboard that was posted on the sidewall of Shibuya 109 Building in
 
Tokyo,bashed this internationally renowned female actress for having insulted her nation by
 
becoming a“sexual slave of the Japanese”(figure 2).The billboard was a product of Kaoh(花
王),a large Japanese cosmetics corporation that launched a campaign project called“Asience,”
which aimed to“go beyond Japanese hair-care market by introducing a new standard of beauty
 
in Asia,”and thereby expand its profit-making territory outside of Japan.?
Kaoh hired Zhang as its first image character in 2003,and the billboard was posted in fall
 
2005 as a timely correspondence to Zhang’s international break through her appearance in
?For greater details,one may refer to Asience homepage(http://www.kao.co.jp/asience/about/brand/
index.html).
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 Memoirs of Geisha ( ),a Rob Marshall film that was based on a bestselling novel by
 
Arthur Golden with the same title.In this Hollywood film,Zhang acted out the role of Sayuri,
a deprived but gifted local Japanese girl who struggles to become a professional geisha and in
 
the process attains the patronage of a rich entrepreneur―the role played by a well-known
 
Japanese actor Ken Watanabe.
In critiquing what Chinese viewers thought to be Zhang’s overshot appearance, the article
 
also highlighted Memoirs of Geisha.This harsh critique had as its backdrop a statement made
 
by Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe two weeks earlier,in which Abe denied any need
 
for Japan to apologize for enforcing women from other parts of Asia, especially China and
 
Korea,into the sexual servitude of the Japanese military force during the Second World War.
Reacting to the U.S.Congressional resolution that called his cabinet to officially acknowledge,
apologize, and accept historical responsibility for the wartime sexual enslavement, Abe
 
stressed that there was no evidence to prove coercion.The article by Record China emphasized
 
Chinese critique against Ziyi Zhang as a manifestation of greater public outcry that was
 
Figure 2.Ziyi Zhang in a semi-nude posture from a billboard on the sidewall of Shibuya 109 Building
 
in Tokyo (March 16,2007 issue of Record China Online).
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 directed against Japan’s neoconservative attitude toward an obvious war crime in Asia.
Just as Abe reiterated his will to acknowledge the forced recruitment of sexual labor,or what
 
Japan euphemistically referred to as “comfort women,”by giving himself up to subsequent
 
international pressures,Zhang’s appearance in Japanese pop media diminished after the event.
Some of my informants speculated that this general decline in Zhang’s media exposure in Japan,
and in particular Kaoh commercial,was the apparent result of Chinese outcry―even though
 
Zhang’s contract with Kaoh Asience expired long before Chinese viewers saw her image on
 
Shibuya 109 billboard,and Kaoh’s change in its image charater had nothing to do with the
 
Chinese response to Zhang’s sexually-provocative representation (figure 3).
Over these three decades of expansion in the Asian market,Japanese trend-setters have been
 
stamping undeniable footprints of J-trend on Chinese consumer culture:the adoration of a
 
legendary Japanese pop idol Momoe Yamaguchi(山口百恵)since 1980s;infux of J-idols―most
 
notably Noriko Sakai(酒井法子)― into the Chinese market in the early 1990s;the collaborative
 
production of Chinese pop idols, such as Shanghai Performance Doll (上海勁舞娃娃), after
 
Asience Models
 
Names  Nations  Periods
 
Tziyi Zhang（章子怡) China 1?/2?0?-1?/2?0?
Kurara Chibana（知花くらら) Japan 2/2?0?-9/2?0?
Chiming Wang（王持明） China 4/2?0?-9/2?0?
Saori Yano（矢野沙織) Japan 5/2?0?-9/2?0?
Kumiko Gotoh（後藤久美子) Japan 1?/2?0?-present
 
Jun Jihyun（全智賢) Korea 1?/2?0?-present
 
Figure 3. The list of Kaoh Asience models and their campaign periods (top), and a new billboard
 
featuring Jun Jihyun (bottom).
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 Figure 4.Examples of J-trend influence from China:Hello Kitty(top),Shanghai Performance Doll
(center),and a scene from anime convention in Shanghai(bottom).
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Japanese models,such as Tokyo Performance Doll and Osaka Performance Doll,in the latter
 
half of the’90s;Hello Kitty and Ultra Man boom since the turn of the millennium;popular
 
habitation of sushi eating,and accompanying debates on the aucenticty or“cultural propriety”
of sushi;and a more recent fad of anime costume-play in China’s urban centers such as
 
Shanghai(figure 4).Yet,Zhang’s case reminds us of how consumers in China,and other Asian
 
countries for that matter,can aribtraily politicize J-trend―regardless of the intention of trend
-setters.Given the complicated sociohistorical trajectory of Asia’s international relationships,
Asian consumers can easily interrupt the multinational flow of popular culture at any moment
 
by setting conventional limits to what popular artists can or cannot do.
This Chinese case recalls reactions from critics to the phenomena of“Japan craze”or ha ri
 
zheng (哈日症)in Taiwan back in 1990s(figure 5).Drawing a parallel between Japan’s colonial
 
aggression in the early modern era and present-day influx of Japanese products into the
 
Taiwanese market,critics such as Jiaowen Qiu( ),Tianduo Li(李天鐸),and Jiaxin Xu(徐
佳馨)professed that the spread of J-trend in Taiwan is a form of national invasion,and J-trend
 
devotees or he ri zu (哈日族)are“cultural dupes”who ended up being absorbed by Japanese
 
corporations (quoted in Ishii 2001).?
Figure 5.An image of J-craze from an online homepage called J-Craze Hospital (哈日病院,http://
www.nobitaworld.com/ashing/). The composer of this URL,He-ri Kyoko (哈日杏子), is a famed
 
Taiwanese cartoonist who purportedly aggravated the cult of J-trend.
?For an earlier critique see also Chuang (1989).
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Against such a perspective, Leo Ching argues that the discernable influence of Japanese
 
products on Taiwanese culture stands in sharp contrast to Japan’s wartime imperialism.
Neither inhibiting native language nor enforcing the destruction of native customs,inclinations
 
toward Japanese popular culture is,for Ching,a matter of personal interest than political issue,
and those who support the discourse of Japanese domination tend to reduce the complexity of
 
contemporary cultural flows into the simple framework of “good and evil.”Even if the
 
significance of economic competition is taken for granted, in what sense this is a cultural
 
domination is,according to Ching,not so clear (Ching 2001:176-179).Yet,Ching admits that
 
Japan is acting as an important economic agent in Taiwan,and that Japanese cultural products
 
are apparently exerting a“discernable influence on the cultural side”(2001:173).
In my own analysis of the spread of Japanese and Japanese-style pop idols across Asia’s new
 
industrial economies(NIEs),I found that the attraction of Japanese cultural products is due to
 
their status-marking value rather than their ideological cost: i.e., Japanese products offer
 
models of urban lifestyles that people of Asia’s upward-moving economies,especially students
 
and young workers,find striking and relevant to their own lives in transition(Aoyagi 2000:310).
Not to say that young J-trend consumers from Asia’s NIEs were ignorant of the ideological
 
debate on the Japanese treatment of other Asian nationalities,these consumers saw no reason
 
in equating their acts of consumption with cultural imprisonment (Aoyagi 2005:251).
Thus,upon framing J-trend in reference to what Joseph Nye (2004)calls “soft power,”or
 
ideological means through which the expressive behavior and personal interests of other Asian
 
nationalities are indirectly influenced, we find that our basic concern of whether J-trend
 
perverts national culture is a matter of opinion. Yet, these nationalities are capable of
 
maintaining their own identities and independent lines of social development regardless of the
 
presence of J-trend―or popular cultural flows from elsewhere for that matter― in their living
 
environment.We also reconfirm that politically sensitive nationalities may set up a normative
 
boundary of consumption,rejecting the overflow of certain external trend as they configure a
 
conventional limit on the collective reception of foreign products.
Japanese Reactions to J-Trend in Asia
 
I situate my current preliminary investigation on the Japanese perception of J-trend―its
 
complicated modes of popularity in other Asian countries― in this sort of setting to better
 
understand how J-trend influences the collective consciousness (or sentiment) of Japanese
 
consumers back in Japan.Over the past two years,I have been cumulating interview data from
 
students to whom I asked to observe various aspects of J-trends that are made available in
 
other Asian countries.Both personal interviews and group discussions were conducted upon
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these informants’return from their destinations in order to gather their reflections on the
 
subject.
As for the ideological implication of J-trend,all of my informants felt that J-trend can easily
 
be regarded as an index of Japanese national power in other Asian countries,just as C-trend
 
or K-trend can easily signify an ever-mightier presence of Chinese or Korean national power
 
in Japan.Without inhibiting native culture and national knowledge,popular cultural flows from
 
abroad can invoke personal impressions about the country in which they originated―however
 
distorted these impressions may be.Having elaborated on this issue,one informant Jun(male,
21 years) commented that someone with no previous knowledge of, or interest in, another
 
country can get a sense of the national potential of that country through the influx of products
 
from,and subsequent media exposures of,that country.
As natives of Japan, however, my informants were all unconscious of how other Asian
 
nationalities evaluated J-trend until they came face to face with such an evaluation. Saki
(female,21 years)recalled feeling very strange when she visited Bangkok and reconfirmed how
 
enthusiastically J-trend was celebrated in Thailand: she saw Japanese and Japanese-like
 
inscriptions on Thai products and realized that they were carelessly inscribed;she viewed
 
countless TV commercials in which Japanese models appeared,but could not recognize any of
 
them because they were all locally-hired average Japanese;and she was approached from time
 
to time by Thai youngsters who kept stressing how superb J-trends were.Saki thought for the
 
first time in her life that Japan and the Japanese can be so profitable or “economically
 
powerful”abroad,and she wished she could use the chance to market herself if only she could
 
stay longer.
Kumi(female,21 years)reported her discovery in Korea that the popularity of Japanese TV
 
drama amongst her Korean acquaintants was indicated to her as a part of friendly gesture,but
 
it came with a reminder that their taste for Japanese drama and extant political tensions
 
between Korea and Japan were two separate issues.Kumi proclaimed how she came to realize
 
that there was an irreparable gap between Korea and Japan through the way in which Korean
 
students’adoration of J-trend was presented to her,and she felt that the Japanese government
 
should work much harder toward settling its wartime responsibilities. Upon questioning
 
whether J-trend could bridge the gap between Korea and Japan,Kumi replied that one may
 
take it that way and see J-trend as a common source of amusement and information exchange
―especially for youngsters who can be far more open to cross-cultural exchange than older and
 
more conservative people.
In Indonesia, where people have been more receptive to Japanese influences ever since
 
Sukarno practiced a clever trick of“national subalternation”to the Japanese military during
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the Second World War, seven of my informants who stayed there agreed that J-trend was
 
admired as the emblem of“cool and high-quality products.”However,these informants found
 
that linguistic incompatibility and cultural distance between Indonesia and Japan prevented
 
Japanese popular cultural forms from attaining easy inroads to Javanese market.Few excep-
tions to this were Japanese manga and anime,which managed to attract younger kids (figure
 
6).According to Kenji(male,22 years),people in Indonesia generally jumbled what they thought
 
to be the splendid Japanese technology,which consisted of electronic, automobile, and sushi
 
industries,with what they roughly heard about the overseas popularity of J-trend,including pop
 
songs,TV dramas,anime,and fashion.Thus,with exceptions of Japanese manga and anime,
J-trend did not have much place in Indonesian pop culture scene. This was similar to the
 
situation reported by my informants who stayed in Manila,Philippines―in terms of cultural
 
distance and the way J-trend is worshipped locally.
These cases demonstrate my informants’realization that J-trend can be a subject of national
 
characterization or cultural stereotyping outside of Japan―whether it is received well or not.
These cases also indicated that my informants were quite unaware of any sociopolitical
 
implications of J-trend until they were reminded of such implications by other nationalities.To
 
borrow from Kumi’s comments,the common people of Japan are“probably careless about the
 
deep meaning of Japanese trendy goods in their everyday life because these goods are so much
 
a part of their lifestyle.”
Figure 6.From a well-read anime magazines among Indonesian youngsters:the August 2004 issue
 
of Animonster,which is subtitled“The best anime and manga magazine in Indonesia.”Cover(left)
and part representing a Javanized manga strip (right).
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When pushed to seek their expectations in J-trend,my informants all wished that J-trend
 
keep operating as an instrument of cross-cultural understanding in evermore parts of Asia
 
today.They thought that the spread of J-trend in other Asian countries may indeed be the
 
outcome of Japanese national and corporate powers to set up infrastructures for local distribu-
tion and consumption,and to disseminate technologies of popular cultural production in the
 
process, but more appealing to them was the idea that J-trend can cater for other Asian
 
nationalities and cultivate common grounds of interest between the Japanese and these other
 
nationalities.“J-trend is not and should not be a political issue first handedly,”said Chiha
(female,22years).
Some informants professed that Japanese people should appreciate the fact that J-trend is
 
received relatively well elsewhere―given the recent international tension between Japan and
 
other Asian countries which originates in Japan’s wartime imperialism.For that matter, J-
trend should not be recycled into a political usage.Representing this sentiment,Shun(male,22
 
years)stated:
It is fortunate to see the members of postwar generation in various parts of Asia coming
 
together to share similar lifestyles without having have to inherit the kind of racial,
ethnic,or national prejudices that their forefathers tended to hold against each other.It
 
is not good to ignore history,I know,and to not think about what Japan did to other
 
Asian countries in the past.Yet,historical procrastination is equally bad, I think.We
［the youngsters of postwar Asia］did not commit those war crimes in the first place,nor
 
do we ever want to!
Kenji (mentioned earlier)provided a similar opinion on this issue,and said:
It is much worse to remain in a mode of historical conflict than to go with the flow of
 
Asia’s open regionalism.We should be thinking about how people of different Asian
 
nationalities can work together to create a better world, and I believe that popular
 
cultural flows ―J-trend, K-trend, or otherwise― can offer great contributions to
 
develop the world of friendship where people of different racial, ethnic, national and
 
historical backgrounds can come together to exchange lifestyles,share cool ideas,and
 
enjoy fantasies!
One may infer from these statements that Japanese youngsters see the instrumentality of J
-trend in developing a new Asian way of life that can encourage coexistence and cooperation
 
of different nationalities.
Upon further inquiring whether or not J-trend was becoming a common index for Asian
 
nationalities to identify their positions in Asia vis-a?-vis Japan and the Japanese,my informants
 
generally implied that I was posing a mis-/leading question by trying to postulate an excessive-
ly political cause.Yuki(female,22 years)indicated that such a view may be held by Japanese
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trend-setters and politically-minded critics, but it may not reflect the general opinion of
 
average Japanese consumers.
All in all,my interview data demonstrated the tendency of Japanese youngsters toward not
 
envisaging J-trend as the source of politico-economic conflict,even though they can see that
 
J-trend may be used by some ideologues to meet political ends―should they wish to do so.Just
 
as any symbolic object can obtain counter-/ideological meaning through the hands of those who
 
wish to articulate it that way,so can J-trend―or other popular cultural flows for that matter.
Yet,one finds within the scope of present investigation that typical Japanese reactions to the
 
celebration of Japanese pop culture in various parts of Asia today stands aloof any potentially
 
side-taking interpretations of the J-trend phenomena.
Summary
 
A complicated symbol with multiple meaning,J-trend can become a projector of personal
 
fantasies at the same time as a referent point of sociopolitical debates.Whether or not to treat
 
J-trend itself as an index of Japan’s national power is matter of opinion, but J-trend can
 
certainly bring its recipients from various parts of Asia together to interact with each other,
and in the process imagine and configure Asia’s regionally-open lifeworld―in ways that these
 
recipients cannot do with more exotic trends from elsewhere.J-trend can enlighten Japanese
 
attendants back home by way of informing how other Asian nationalities view Japanese nation,
government,industry,history,and/or people.
While the overseas popularity of J-trend may inspire Japanese and pro-Japanese trend-
setters to pursue national and/or corporate interests,a blind inclination toward the reassurance
 
of Japanese national power over other Asian nationalities through J-trend is to neglect what
 
average consumers ―Japanese or otherwise― wish to see in the regional flow of Japanese
 
popular culture:i.e., an expectation that popular culture can cultivate common grounds for
 
cross-cultural communication,exchange,and understanding.
In questioning whether the world is becoming “Japanized”through J-trend, Iwabuchi con-
tends that the tremendous diffusion of Japanese commodities articulates the universal appeal
 
of Japanese cultural products and the disappearance of any perceptible“Japaneseness,”which
 
is subtly incorporated into the localization strategies of the media industries.Thus,the cultural
 
influence of J-trend tends to be an“invisible colonization”(Iwabuchi 2002:33).Iwabuchi uses
 
the term“cultural odor”to emphasize the manner in which certain popular commodities come
 
to represent cultural features of a country in which these commodities originate―in most cases
 
stereotyped images or ideas of the country’s national lifestyle― in the process of transnational
 
consumption.He states that Japan’s invisible colonization is reflected in the fact that J-trend
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is“odorless”in countries where it is disseminated,implying that Japanese consumer goods in
 
these countries lack any influential idea of Japan (2002:27,28).
I find such an essentialist portrayal of J-trend as a form of cultural imperialism to be highly
 
misleading (perhaps pro-imperialist itself!),and instead propose with respect to ethnographic
 
data that I gathered a perspective that the cultural odor of J-trend is a matter of sensitivities
 
and attitudes of those who make use of J-trend in-and outside of Japan.There is no way of
 
predetermining exactly how influential J-trend in Asia can be,although there are sociocultural,
politico-economic,and historical conditions and identifications that lead people to frame J-
trend into a form of cultural colonization,which is analogous to the so-called“Coca-Coloniza-
tion”(Kuisel 1991), “Disneyization”(Bryman 2004), or “McDonaldization”(Ritzer 2008).
Whether or not this is a“false consciousness”that allows Japanese and pro-Japanese corporate
 
imperialists to continually venture toward cultural colonization behind the ideological veil of
 
regional amusement will depend upon further examinations of J-trend,its social effects,and
 
mind-sets of those who revolve around it.
I am by no means trying to make any conclusive statement about how the significance of J
-trend in Asia ought to be interpreted,but to demonstrate a first-round inference on the social
 
meaning of Japanese popular culture in Asia’s industrial economies in reference to ethnographic
 
case studies. If any hypothesis is to be put forth here, I would contend that the collective
 
demand for J-trend will prevail in Asia as long as J-trend will continue to emit odors as it has
 
been doing so,and stimulate other Asian nationalities in one way or another.And,so long as
 
the Japanese lifestyle keep fascinating Japanese consumers at home,so will Japanese popular
 
cultural forms continue to attract other Asian nationalities to which these forms are extensive-
ly disseminated.
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